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272 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-WATKINS v. UNITED 
STATES AS A LIMITATION ON POWER OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTI-
GATING COMMITTEES-In order that Congress may effectively ex-
ercise its legislative function it must have information upon which 
to act. Thus, although the Constitution does not expressly grant 
an investigative power, by necessary implication Congress has 
the authority to gather information through its various commit-
tees.1 There was little occasion in the past to question the limits 
of this implied power. Congressional committees, until recent-
ly, rarely attempted to exceed a purely information-seeking 
1 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
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function.2 This self-restraint, combined with a reluctance on 
the part of the courts to find that an investigation had been con-
ducted for an improper purpose, left the scope of the investigative 
power practically unfettered by judicial decree.3 The past decade, 
however, has witnessed a decided change in the activities of some 
congressional committees. No longer limiting themselves to the 
traditional information-gathering role, some committees have as: 
sumed the function of an information-giving agency, with their 
primary objective often being to expose "subversive" or "unde-
sirable" persons before the court of public opinion.4 With the 
advent of this enlarged sphere of activity, congressional witnesses 
have sought to invoke various constitutional limitations and guar-
antees in an effort to avoid damaging committee inquiries. In at 
least one respect these efforts have secured a measure of success. 
The privilege against self-incrimination has been consistently 
recognized by the Supreme Court as being applicable to congres-
sional investigations and has been utilized to the legal maximum 
by numerous witnesses.5 Although a number of attempts have been 
made to invoke other constitutional guarantees or to assert a gen-
eral lack of authority in a particular committee, until Watkins v. 
United States6 such efforts were uniformly unsuccessful.7 
In the Watkins case a labor official was convicted of contempt 
of Congress for refusing before the Un-American Activities Com-
mittee to identify certain persons alleged to have been formerly 
members of the Communist Party.8 The witness did not rely on 
2 Landis, "Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation," 
40 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 153 (1926); Smelser, "Legislative Investigations: Safeguards for Wit-
nesses; The •Problem in Historical Perspective," 29 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 163 (1954). 
S Jn Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 at 190 (1881), the Supreme Court took the 
position that there is a general "right of privacy" which shelters a witness from the 
inquiries of congressional committees. In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 171 
(1927), however, the Court narrowed the right to cases in which Congress did not have 
a legitimate legislative purpose for conducting the investigation into private affairs. 
See also Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 at 294 (1926). This limitation has not 
provided a meaningful check on the investigating power since the courts have been 
willing to presume the existence of a proper legislative purpose. McGrain v. Daugherty, 
supra this note, at 177-178. See also United States v. Or.man, (3d Cir. 1947) 207 F. (2d) 148. 
4 See Rogers, "Congressional Investigations: The Problem and Its Solution," 18 
UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 464 at 468 (1951). 
5 See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. United States, 349 
U.S. 190 (1955). 
6 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
7 See United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S. 
838 (1948); .Lawson v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 49, cert. den. 339 U.S. 
934 (1950). 
8 Watkins v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 681, noted in 42 VA. L. REv. 
675 (1956), 9 VAND. L. REV. 872 (1956). 
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the right against self-incrimination, but challenged generally the 
authority of the committee to make such interrogations.9 On certi-
orari, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction. In so doing, for 
the first time in modern history, the Court looked beyond self-in-
crimination principles to subject the congressional investigatory 
power to other significant constitutional limitations. It is the pur-
-pose of this comment to examine the nature and extent of the 
restraints imposed by the W atliins case as well as the potential 
problems raised by the decision. 
I. Due Process of Law: A Fundamental Limitation 
Federal penal statutes which contain vague or ambiguous lan-
guage are void under the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.10 The Contempt of Congress Statute11 provides that a wit-
ness shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if he refuses to answer before 
a congressional committee any question "pertinent to the question 
under inquiry." A clear definition of the "question under in-
quiry" is obviously essential if a witness is to determine whether 
or not a given interrogatory is "pertinent." It therefore follows 
that the nature and extent of the "question under inquiry" must 
be made explicit if a conviction under the congressional contempt 
legislation is to satisfy the definiteness requirements of due process. 
This defense of vagueness had been urged on several prior occa-
sions but was generally unsuccessful.12 The Watkins case accepts 
9 Petitioner made the following statement: "I am not going to plead the fifth 
amendment, but I refuse to answer certain questions that I believe are outside the 
proper scope of your committee's activities. I will answer any questions which this 
committee puts to me about myself. I will also answer questions about those persons 
whom I knew to be members of the Communist Party and whom I believe still are. 
I will not, however, answer any questions with respect to others with whom I associated 
in the past .... " Principal case at 185. 
10 E.g., United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Connally v. General 
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). 
1152 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. (1952) §192. 
12 In Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241 at 247, cert. den. 334 
U.S. 843 (1948), the court declared the Resolution of the Un-American Activities Com-
mittee to be sufficiently definite. The Court said: "It is said that the Resolution is too 
vague to be valid. Perhaps the one phrase 'un-American propaganda activities,' taken 
alone as it appears in subclause (i) of the Resolution, would be subject to that con-
demnation. But the clause •.. 'subversive and un-American propaganda that ••• 
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed ,by our Constitution,' 
which is subclause (ii), is definite enough. It conveys a clear meaning, and that is all 
that is required." See also Lawson v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 49, cert. 
den. 339 U.S. 934 (1950). In United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82 
at 87, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948), the court held that a witness who refused to 
answer any questions, and was therefore not put to the decision as to the probability 
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this due process rationale and holds that, on the facts before the 
Court, the requirements of definiteness were not satisfied. 
Although the majority opinion seems clearly correct in its 
statement and application of the law, the conclusion reached by 
the Court and, in some instances, the language it employs, pose 
several interesting questions. On policy grounds alone it may be 
urged that the due process requirement of definiteness should not 
be imposed on the authorizing resolutions of congressional investi-
gating committees. There is certainly some merit in the view that 
Congress must be allowed to delegate broad authority to its com-
mittees if the committee system is to retain any effectiveness. The 
primary objective of the investigative process being to determine 
the need for new legislation, committees must have broad discre-
tion with which to function.13 If Congress is required narrowly to 
confine the scope of its committees' authority, the net result might 
well be the necessity of establishing ad hoc committees for each in-
vestigation to be conducted.14 This could impose an undue burden 
on the Congress and seriously impair the effectiveness of any par-
ticular investigation.15 
The majority opinion indicates that clarification of the "ques-
tion under inquiry" may be achieved from at least three sources: 
the committee's authorizing resolution, the remarks of the chair-
man or members of the committee, and the nature of the immedi-
ate proceedings.16 The majority seems to assume that the "question 
under inquiry" may be some topic of investigation more narrow 
in scope than the committee's overall authority,17 and that clear 
of criminal liability for a refusal to answer, could not challenge the vague language of 
the authorizing statute on due process grounds. One court has held that the vagueness 
principle applies only to penal legislation and is, therefore, not applicable to the con-
gressional contempt legislation. United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 
58, revd. on other grounds (D.C. Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 525, revd. 339 U.S. 323 (1950). 
This view seems clearly erroneous in light of the fact that a witness may be fined 
and jailed for a refusal to answer. No other court has taken this position. 
13 See note, "The Power of Congress To Investigate and To Compel Testimony," 70 
HARv. L. R.Ev. 671 at 680 (1957). 
Hid. at 681. 
15 See the dissenting opinion of Justice Clark in the principal case. 
16 Principal case at 209. 
17 Some courts have assumed, without expressly holding, that the "question under 
inquiry" is co-extensive with the committees' jurisdiction as defined by statute or resolu-
tion. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 at 297 (1929). In Barry v. United States 
ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 at 613 (1929), the Court, in dicta, said, "When 
evidence is taken by a committee, the pertinency of questions propounded must be 
determined by reference to the scope of the authority vested in the committee by the 
Senate." 
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definition of this immediate subject of investigation would satisfy 
due process requirements. Yet it seems clear that the congressional 
contempt statute is not intended to convict witnesses for refusing 
to answer questions which Congress has not given the committee 
authority to ask.18 Even though the nature and extent of the im-
mediate investigation is made clear, in order to weigh the risk of 
potential criminal prosecution for a refusal to answer, the witness 
must be able to ascertain whether the subject of inquiry is within 
the committee's overall jurisdiction. Under an indefinite and 
vague authorizing resolution a witness is unable to make this de-
termination. It would seem, therefore, that it is the definition of 
the committee's total jurisdiction as set forth in its authorizing 
resolution that is critical from the standpoint of due process. If it 
is assumed that the question under inquiry is co-extensive with 
the committee's overall authority, it is nevertheless difficult to see 
how the remarks of the committee members in any one hearing 
could define the overall authority sufficiently to satisfy due process 
requirements. On the other hand it is possible that a course of 
consistent conduct on the part of a committee which has chan-
neled its inquiries into reasonably defined areas, and avoided oth-
ers, might be adequate to induce the courts to find that an original-
ly vague resolution had been rendered sufficiently definite.19 
It is established that Congress has the implied authority to try 
recalcitrant witnesses for contempt of its committees without resort 
to the judiciary.20 The present system of prosecuting congressional 
contempt cases before the federal courts was inaugurated only be-
cause of limitations on the length of time the House of Representa-
tives could restrain witnesses found to be in contempt.21 Even 
under a system of congressional trials, the witness would probably 
be able to secure judicial review by means of a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding.22 In view of the majority's holding on the vagueness issue, 
18 United States v. Orman, (3d Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 148 at 153. 
19 The majority opinion at least hints at this possibility in reference to ·the resolu-
tion before it: "At one time, perhaps, the resolution might have been read narrowly 
to confine the Committee to the subject of propaganda. The events that have transpired 
in the fifteen years before the interrogation of petitioner makes such a construction im-
possible at this date." Principal case at 202. 
20 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204 (1821). 
21 The Supreme Court has held that no person may be imprisoned by the House 
of Representatives longer than the legislative session during which he was convicted. 
Id. at 231. 
22 It has been argued that the courts cannot review congressional trials for contempt. 
Morgan, "Congressional Investigations and Judicial Review: Kilbourn v. Thompson 
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the question arises as to whether the standards of definiteness re-
quired by the court would be held equally applicable in habeas 
corpus proceedings were Congress to prosecute contempt cases 
before its own bar to avoid the restrictions of the certainty require-
ment.23 
When Congress commits a witness for contempt, it may be 
argued that the purpose is to hold him until he is willing to testify 
and not to punish him for a refusal to testify. If this difference 
causes the contempt to be classified as civil rather than criminal, 
the definiteness requirements applicable to penal legislation would 
not seem to apply. It may be further argued that a congressional 
finding that a witness was in contempt for refusing to answer a 
committee interrogation would necessarily constitute a ratification 
of the committee's authority to ask the disputed question. Yet the 
same contention could be made under the present system since 
contempt proceedings are never initiated by the Attorney General 
unless directed by the house concerned.24 Since penal legislation 
must satisfy definiteness requirements as of the time an offense 
is committed, the ratification argument seems untenable in either 
case. 
II. Unconfined Investigative Authority: First Amendment 
Implications 
Whether the First Amendment applies to the investigatory 
powers of Congress and the extent to which it limits that power 
if applicable have been in considerable doubt.25 The Supreme 
Court, prior to the Watkins case, had an opportunity to settle the 
question but avoided the constitutional issue.26 The question has 
been squarely presented to the lower federal courts on several oc-
casions, and although generally the result has been favorable to 
the applicability of the amendment, in all instances the infringe-
Revisited," 37 CALIF. L. REv. 556 (1949). Congress has permitted review, however. See 
note, "The Power of Congress To Investigate and To Compel Testimony." 70 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 671 at 672 (1957), note 110, and cases cited therein. 
23 Justice Clark raises this question in his dissent. 
24 49 Stat. 2041 (1936), 2 U.S.C. (1952) §194 provides that the President of the 
Senate or Speaker of the House shall submit, under seal of the Senate or House, a 
statement of the facts concerning the contempt to the United States Attorney for ap• 
propriate action. 
25 See generally 65 YALE L. J. 1159 (1956); 29 IND. L. J. 162 (1954). 
26 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1958). 
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ment of the First Amendment freedoms has been found justified.27 
It seems clear that congressional investigations may lead to a cur-
tailment of freedoms protected by the First Amendment. This is 
not to say that the First Amendment includes a general freedom 
to remain silent. The policy which supports a right to open dis-
cussion would not seem also to support a right to remain silent. 
But the First Amendment does apply whenever political thought 
or affiliation is restricted in any manner by any governmental 
agency.28 If the effect of an investigation is to deter either a wit-
ness or an onlooker from future political affiliation or expression, 
it would seem that First Amendment rights have been abridged. 
The Watkins case explicitly adopts this reasoning.20 
But individual liberties are not absolute. It has long been es-
tablished that danger to the general welfare will justify some cur-
tailment of personal rights, 30 though the degree of danger neces-
sary to provide a justification is a matter of some uncertainty.31 
The Supreme Court decisions which have dealt with this problem 
have been concerned with legislation, not with legislative investi-
gations. Lower courts which have considered the First Amendment 
in relation to the investigative power have been uncertain whether 
the tests applicable to legislation are equally applicable to the 
investigative process. 32 Wat kins does little to answer this com-
plex question. Although the majority opinion declares that the 
First Amendment may be invoked before congressional investi-
27 Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241 at 247, cert. den. 334 
U.S. 843 (1948). Cf. United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 
333 U.S. 838 (1948). 
28 See generally 65 YALE (L. J. 1159 (1956). 
29 The majority opinion refers to the impact on beliefs, expressions, or associations. 
It must probably be assumed that the primary concern of the Court is the impact on 
political thought and conduct. This would seem to be true in light of the particular 
facts before the Court. The Un-American Activities Committee has been mainly con-
cerned with political affiliations. Furthermore, since the Court does not appear to adopt 
a general freedom to remain silent, it must be assumed that the right that is recognized 
is limited to areas of conduct or belief most sensitive to oppressive influence. Compare 
the protection of academic freedom in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), 
noted p. 291 infra. 
30 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
31 Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) with Yates v. United States, 
354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
32 In Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241, cert. den. 334 U.S. 
843 (1948), the court said at 247: "There is a vast difference between the necessities for 
inquiry and the .necessities for action. The latter may be only when danger is clear and 
present, but the former is when danger is reasonably represented as potential." Cf. 
United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948). 
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gating committees, 33 it does not hold that the particular investiga-
tion in question violated First Amendment limitations. The Court 
never determines, on the facts, whether there was a sufficient justi-
fication for the investigation into First Amendment matters; nor 
does the Court indicate the test to be applied if such a determina-
tion is to be made. Rather the majority opinion stresses the point 
that when a congressional committee compels testimony in sensi-
tive areas of political conduct or belief, it is essential that its au-
thority to conduct the investigation be explicitly spelled out by 
Congress.34 The Court seems to relate this requirement to the 
problem of determining whether or not an invasion of First 
Amendment freedoms is justified in terms of public necessity. Al-
though it is the task of the judiciary to make the final decision as 
to whether public necessity outweighs private rights, the Court 
indicates it is unable to make this crucial determination unless 
it can ascertain that Congress actually desires the particular in-
vestigation to be conducted.35 It is doubtful that the majority 
opinion means to imply by this that a clear congressional mandate 
to conduct a particular investigation would necessarily provide 
a justification for First Amendment infringements. The Court 
does seem to be implying, however, that, absent a clear determina-
tion by Congress that a particular investigation will serve a valid 
legislative purpose, any investigation into areas of political affilia-
tion or belief will be invalid. The perplexing aspect of this im-
as "Clearly, an investigation is subject to the command that the Congress shall 
make no law abridging freedom of speech or press or assembly." Principal case at 197. 
34 "Protected freedoms should not be placed in danger in the absence of a clear 
determination by the House or the Senate that a particular inquiry is justified by a 
specific legislative need." Principal case at 205. Compare the rationale of the Court 
in the companion case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), noted p. 
291 infra. There the petitioner was convicted of contempt in the New Hampshire 
courts for refusing to answer questions before a one-man investigating committee in 
connection with the petitioner's progressive party leanings and in connection with certain 
of his college lectures. The investigation was carried out under a New Hampshire 
statute which gave the attorney general authority to investigate and determine whether 
"subversive" persons were present within the state. The Court seemed to take the posi-
tion that state investigations into areas of political conduct or belief are invalid under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the state legislature fails nar-
rowly to define the authority of the investigating agency. 
35 "An excessively broad charter, like that of the House Un-American Activities 
Committee, places the courts in an untenable position if they are to strike a balance 
between the public need for a particular interrogation and the right of citizens to carry 
on their affairs free from unnecessary governmental interference. It is impossible in such 
a situation to ascertain whether any legislative purpose justifies the disclosures sought 
and, if so, the importance of that information to the Congress in furtherance of its 
legislative function." Principal case at 205-206. 
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plication lies in the fact that the Court presumably would invali-
date on due process grounds any investigation conducted under 
a broad, indefinite resolution, whether it invaded First Amend-
ment areas or not.36 It would, therefore, seem completely unneces-
sary to discuss First Amendment implications when dealing with 
an overbroad resolution.37 The explanation for the majority's ex-
tended discussion of First Amendment rights is probably found 
in its analysis of the due process issue. The majority opinion seems 
to take the position that the due process requirement couJd be 
satisfied even though the committee is granted authority in vague 
and sweeping terms. This is revealed by the fact that although the 
Court decides that the authorizing resolution of the Un-American 
Activities Committee is too indefinite to satisfy due process, it then 
goes on to determine whether the committee's remarks or inter-
rogations clarified the question under inquiry for the petitioner. 
This approach seems to overlook the fact that even if the commit-
tee did pinpoint the nature of its immediate investigation, the wit-
ness would still have to determine whether the immediate inquiry 
was within the overall authority of the committee. In the final 
analysis, therefore, it would seem that due process would require 
an explicit authorizing resolution. If this is true it would have to 
be concluded that the First Amendment aspects of the majority 
opinion are completely unnecessary. Even if the court's approach 
to the due process question is accepted, it is doubtful that its dis-
cussion of First Amendment problems is more than dictum. The 
majority's only express holding is that the authorizing resolution 
of the committee violates due process. 
III. Unconfined Investigative Authority: Exposure Implications 
The federal government may exert only those powers which 
are expressly granted to it by the Constitution or which are found 
36 See part I of this comment, supra. 
37 There may be a valid distinction between over-broad legislation impinging upon 
First Amendment freedoms and legislation which violates due process because it is 
too vague and indefinite. The fact that the majority opinion makes no such distinction as 
regards a congressional committee's authorizing resolution seems understandable. In 
its discussion of 'First Amendment rights and in its discussion of the exposure question, 
the majority's concern is centered on the lack of a definite standard in the committee's 
authority; that broad discretion placed in committee hands makes it impossible for a 
court to determine the true desires of Congress. This requirement that there be a definite 
standard in order to confine committee discretion seems indistinguishable from the re-
quirement of definiteness necessary to satisfy due process. 
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by the Supreme Court to exist by necessary implication.38 The 
Supreme Court has held that there is an implied power in Con-
gress to conduct investigations to aid it in carrying out its legisla-
tive duties.39 Thus, Congress clearly has the authority to investi-
gate in order to ascertain the need for new legislation and to de-
termine the effectiveness of existing legislation. Congress has no 
legislative authority to indict or convict persons for legal or social 
wrongdoing.40 It would seem, therefore, that a congressional in-
vestigation which seeks to punish individuals or organizations is 
not in aid of a legislative function and is unauthorized. The recent 
tendency of some congressional committees to expose "subversive" 
groups and individuals41 and the assumption by some committees 
of a publicity function have raised the question of whether these 
activities are properly within the legitimate scope of the investiga-
tive authority. It seems clear that if the motive behind a particular 
inquiry is to expose a witness in order to cause his social ostracism, 
the investigation is primarily a punitive device, and is outside the 
proper scope of legislative inquiry.42 It also seems clear that ex-
posure is justified when it is merely incidental to acquiring in-
formation vital to the drafting of new legislation, determining the 
need for legislation, or policing existing legislation.43 If the com-
mittee desires to expose the witness in order to inform the public 
of particular subversive activities or general social evils so as to 
gain public enthusiasm for preventive legislation, the question is 
not as easy.44 
The Watkins decision explicitly states that "exposure for ex-
posure's sake" is not a proper objective for a congressional investi-
as McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819). 
39 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 174, 175 (1927). 
40 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). See also United States v. Icardi, (D.C. 
D.C. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 383 at 388. 
41 The Un-American Activities Committee has said: "Exposure in a systematic way 
began with the formation of the House on Un-American Activities, May 26, 1938. . • • 
The House Committee on Un-American Activities was started on its way May 20, 1938, 
with the instructions from the United States House of Representatives to expose people 
and organizations attempting to destroy this country. That is still its job and to that 
job it sticks." House Committee on Un-American Activities, "100 Things You Should 
Know About Communism," H. Doc. 136, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 19, 67 (1951). 
42 See Alstyne, "Congressional Investigations," 15 F.R.D. 471 (1954); IO ARK. L. 
REv. 210 (1956). 
43 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). See Landis, "Constitutional Limitations 
on the Congressional Powers of Investigation," 40 HARv. L. REv. 153 (1926). 
44 See Liacos, "Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees,'' 33 BoST. 
UNIV. L. REv. 337 at 344 to 346 (1953); 44 KY. L.J. 318 (1956). 
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gation.45 The Court does not hold, however, that the Un-American 
Activities Committee had such an objective when it questioned 
the petitioner. The Court is, therefore, not required to define with 
precision the meaning of the phrase, "exposure for exposure's 
sake."46 The majority takes much the same approach on the ex-
posure issue as it takes on the First Amendment problem.47 It 
stresses the fact that under an unconfined delegation of investiga-
tive authority it is impossible to determine whether Congress ac-
, tually desires, or has use for the data which it gathered. Under 
such circumstances a court is unable to determine whether the 
exposure that results from an investigation into private affairs is 
justified by a furtherance of the legislative function of Congress.48 
The implication of the Court's reasoning seems to be that any 
investigation which exposes the private activities of witnesses is in-
valid unless Congress has explicitly authorized the particular inves-
tigation to be conducted. Here, as on the question of First Amend-
ment freedoms, it must probably be concluded that the Court's 
discussion is unnecessary in view of its ultimate holding. Since 
the majority concludes that a congressional investigation is sub-
ject to the definiteness requirement of due process, it would pre-
sumably strike down an indefinite authorizing resolution in any 
event, and the fact that the committee was exposing private affairs 
would seem irrelevant in such a case. Yet if the Court's position 
is that due process can be satisfied notwithstanding an over-broad 
and ambiguous resolution, the question arises as to the constitu-
tional basis upon which the Court would invalidate an investiga-
tion which exposed the private affairs of congressional witnesses. 
411 "We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake 
of exposure." Principal case at 200. 
46 The Court does indicate that it is a proper function of Congress to inquire 
into and publicize corruption, maladministration and inefficiency in agencies of the 
government. Principal case at 200, note 33. Apparently the Court would not permit 
exposure as a device to solicit public support for remedial legislation. 
47 In fact, it is difficult to determine whether the Court's analysis requires separa-
tion of the two problems. Since at least part of the abridgement of First Amendment 
freedoms is presumably brought about by the coercive effect on persons who are exposed 
by investigating committees, the two problems may overlap. However, if the abridgement 
of First Amendment rights may occur absent any publicity aspects, the two problems 
are clearly distinct. There may be exposure of private affairs which would have no 
coercive effect on the -beliefs or affiliations of on-lookers. 
48 "In deciding what to do with the power that has -been conferred upon them, 
members of the committee may act, pursuant to motives that seem to them to be the 
highest. Their decisions, nevertheless, can lead to ruthless exposure of private lives in 
order to gather data that is neither desired by the Congress nor useful to it." Principal 
case at 205. 
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Since the Court's objection is not exposure itself, but seems to be 
the fact that an unconfined resolution makes it impossible to deter-
mine if the exposure is justified, it seems probable that the Court 
would predicate its decision on delegation of power principles.49 
If it is assumed that a congressional committee's authority to in-
vestigate constitutes a delegation of legislative power, such prin-
ciples could be used to invalidate any grant of authority placing 
uncontrolled discretion in the hands of committee members.50 The 
implication to be drawn from the language of the majority opin-
ion, however, is that the Court would use such a weapon only 
when a committee had engaged in exposure. Thus it would appear 
that a committee could continue to investigate under a broad res-
olution if it avoided inquiry into personal affairs or provided pro-
cedural safeguards by which it could elicit personal information 
without exposing witnesses before the public.51 
Conclusion 
The Watkins decision holds that congressional investigative 
authority is subject to the definiteness requirement of due process. 
The majority opinion implies, but does not expressly hold, that 
investigations which probe into political beliefs or affiliations, or 
which expose the private affairs of witnesses are invalid if authority 
to conduct the particular investigation is not explicitly indicated 
in the committee's authorizing resolution. The implication is that 
such investigations would be invalidated on delegation of power 
principles. If the definiteness requirements. of due process will 
always lead to the invalidation of broad, ambiguous authorizing 
resolutions, delegation of power limitations are unnecessary. If 
due process can be satisfied notwithstanding a broad grant of au-
thority, delegation principles would operate to strike down in-
49 That this would be the Court's approach is indicated by the majority's frequent 
reference to "delegated power" and "committee discretion." 
50 It may be questioned, of course, whether the principles governing the delegation 
of authority to administrative agencies or to the executive branch should be equally 
applicable to the delegation of investigative authority to a congressional committee 
composed entirely of members of Congress. 
51 Procedural safeguards for witnesses have been suggested by many writers. See 
Galloway, "Congressional Investigations: Proposed Reforms," 18 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 478 
(1951). See also Kauper, "Government of Laws-Not of Men. A Comparison of Congres-
sional Investigative Procedures and Judicial Procedures with Reference to the Examina-
tion of Witnesses," 33 MICH. ST. B.J. 9 (August, 1954). 
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vestigations which probe into political conduct, or which expose 
the private affairs of witnesses. It must be concluded, therefore, 
that the Watkins case requires that Congress narrowly define the 
scope of authority of its various investigating committees. It clear-
ly requires this in the case of committees which investigate sensi-
tive areas of conduct;52 it probably requires it in all cases. 
Allan L. Bioff, S. Ed. 
52In the r&ent case of United States v. ·Peck, (D.C. D.C. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 603, the 
Wa~kins case was relied upon to acquit a newspaperman of contempt for refusing to 
identify certain persons as communists before the Internal Security Subcommittee. The 
court found the major defect in the investigations of the subcommittee to be the vague-
ness of the resolution pursuant to which they were conducted. Because of this vague 
resolution, the investigation of political conduct was ·held invalid. The court also indicat-
ed :that the vagueness of the resolution prevented the witness from ascertaining what 
the "question under inquiry" was. This violated due process principles of "fundamental 
fairness" and necessitated an acquittal. 
